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ABSTRACT  
Background Systems for large-scale data exchanges are playing a pivotal role in the gover-
nance, surveillance, and social control of criminality in different parts of the world.
Analysis This article explores the case study of the Prüm system, which is a technological
system for the exchange of DNA data among several European Union (EU) countries. Making
use of the concept of data journeys, it addresses how the transnational exchange of DNA data
in the EU implicates the construction of categories of suspicion.
Conclusion and implications The article shows how supranational- and national-level
notions and attitudes over the ownership of data shape data journeys, and it discusses the
societal implications of datafication and emerging data justice issues.
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RÉSUMÉ
Contexte Les systèmes d’échange de données à grande échelle jouent un rôle central dans
la gouvernance, la surveillance et le contrôle social de la criminalité dans différentes régions
du monde. 
Analyse Dans cet article, nous prenons l’étude de cas du système Prüm, qui est un système
technologique permettant l’échange de données d’ADN entre plusieurs pays de l’Union
européenne (UE). En utilisant le concept de trajets de données, nous examinons comment
l’échange transnational de données d’ADN dans l’UE implique la construction de catégories
de suspicion. 
Conclusion et implications Nous montrons comment les trajets de données sont
façonnés par des notions et attitudes supranationales et nationales sur la propriété des
données et discutons des implications sociétales de la communication des données et des
nouveaux problèmes émergents de justice des données.
Mots clés Système Prüm; Trajets de données; Données d’ADN; Catégories de suspicion.
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Introduction
On May 21, 2015, an elderly couple were found raped and killed in their home in the
city of Vienna, Austria. Although the Austrian police found the alleged killer’s DNA,
no DNA matches1 were identified in the national DNA database. However, under a
transnational agreement on DNA data exchange among European Union countries,
the Dutch DNA database offered a DNA match for a 29-year-old Polish man. The
Austrian authorities began looking for him. The suspect was arrested at a railway sta-
tion in Düsseldorf, Germany, on June 8, 2015. There was suspicion that this man might
have committed violent crimes in other European countries. Therefore, the authorities
of other EU countries—namely, the U.K., Sweden, and Germany—started looking for
matches in the Polish DNA database. The suspect’s DNA profile matched several
unidentified crime scene stains (Machado & Granja, 2018).
The matches in this criminal case were produced in the context of the Prüm sys-
tem, a transnational system of surveillance and identification designed to govern
some of the most contentious and high-profile issues in current European politics,
such as cross-border crime and terrorism. This network was created to exchange bio-
metric data (DNA profiles, fingerprints, as well as motor vehicle information) stored
in the state databases of different European Union (EU) member countries (European
Union Council, 2008a, 2008b). This article focuses solely on exploring the data jour-
neys of DNA data in the EU and the implications for the construction of categories of
suspicion.
The Viennese criminal case encompasses several interesting facets to explain why
this case study is important in the context of data power. First, the hero of the story
was a DNA match, thus relating the criminal case to a data narrative widely circulated
that portrays DNA technologies as holding the unrivalled power to identify perpetra-
tors of crimes (Lynch, Cole, McNally, & Jordan, 2008). Framed more broadly, this data
narrative thus conveys that complex societal problems, such as serious crimes com-
mitted by transnational criminals, might be worked out by expanding the scope of
DNA profiling and databasing. Transnational DNA data exchange enabled by the Prüm
system is thus presented as a powerful, objective, and neutral method for solving seri-
ous crimes (Prainsack & Toom, 2010, 2013).
Second, the European scenario is particularly interesting due to the mandatory
nature of the Prüm system. Coming into force in 2008 (European Union Council,
2008a, 2008b), the Prüm Decisions established the mandatory exchange by all EU
member states of DNA profiles across the EU, regardless of each country’s particular
socio-economic conditions and technical traditions regarding the management of
biometric data. Currently, 25 EU member states have operationalized the exchange
of DNA data within the Prüm system (European Union Council, 2019).2 Nevertheless,
the level of implementation of Prüm varies widely, for example while the
Netherlands and Austria are connected to 23 countries, Bulgaria is exchanging DNA
data with nine countries and the United Kingdom with one country (European
Union Council, 2019).
The third element outlined by the criminal case regards the villain of the story:
an Eastern European man moving around Europe and potentially committing crimes
in different countries. This case is associated with the narrative of the increasing
transnational movement of people and growing cross-border crime (Broeders, 2007;
Guild & Geyer, 2008; Hufnagel & McCartney, 2017; Lyon, 2004), and more importantly,
relates this case to complex historical and geopolitical intersections between power
and agency, which frame relations between Western and Eastern Europe (Wolff, 1994). 
The Prüm system and data journeys
There are a number of ethical implications related to the transnational exchange of
forensic DNA data under the Prüm regime, with most of the academic debate focusing
on data protection, the excessive surveillance of citizens, and potential threats to civil
rights, such as privacy, liberty, and the presumption of innocence (McCartney, 2010;
McCartney, Wilson, & Williams, 2011; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007). This article
chooses a different approach, instead building on insight from science and technology
studies (STS) to examine the transnational exchange of DNA data. In the last two
decades, STS have significantly contributed to critical thinking about the creation and
expansion of the forensic DNA databases used to support the activities of criminal
prosecution and the criminal justice system (Cole, 2001; Jasanoff, 1998, 2006; Lawless,
2012; Lawless & Williams, 2010; Lynch, 2003; Williams & Johnson, 2005).
Inspired by such contributions, the concept of data journeys (Bates, Lin, &
Goodale, 2016; Leonelli, 2016) is used here to address the “travels” of DNA data in the
EU and the implications for the construction of categories of suspicion. According to
Sabina Leonelli (2016), data journeys constitute “the material, social and institutional
circumstances by which data are packaged and transported across research situations,
so as to function as evidence for a variety of knowledge claims” (p. 5). Applied to the
Prüm system, the concept of data journeys allows for empirically grasping the decisions
involved in the practices of data production, processing, management, and use, while
simultaneously outlining how data objects move through space and time connecting
different sites of practice across vast data infrastructures (Bates, Lin, & Goodale, 2016).
In addition, to conceptualize DNA as something that travels helps draw attention to
the mutability of data, illuminating how they are adapted for different purposes by di-
verse practitioners (Bates et al., 2016; Leonelli, 2016). By interrogating the processes
of data management as performative, data journeys thus foster an understanding of
the practices through which data can be differently apprehended, acquired, repre-
sented, transformed, and integrated.
In the specific case of the Prüm system, such an approach illuminates how forms
of subjectivation—in this case, criminalization—do not only depend on the actual in-
formation provided by the data but also on the epistemic positioning of practitioners
and on the larger social and political setting within which the data travel. In other
words, the journeys of DNA data are entangled with the production of particular cat-
egories of suspicion, such as certain populations from particular Eastern European
countries and other non-EU migrants. The term categories of suspicion is used to out-
line how “suspects are constituted through social interaction with criminal justice sys-
tem agents, agencies, and processes” in ways that deploy the “demographic,
socioeconomic, and cultural stigma that criminal justice agents associate with suspect
status” (Cole & Lynch, 2006, p. 40).
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Case study methodology
This article is based on a European Research Council (ERC)-funded project3 that aims
to explore the societal, cultural, ethical, regulatory, and political impacts of the use of
DNA technologies in the EU. This research utilizes a multi-methodological approach,
including the collection and analysis of legislation and documentation, as well as in-
terviews with forensic practitioners directly involved with the Prüm system. This article
draws on insight from 32 semi-structured recorded and transcribed interviews con-
ducted in 20 European countries with 40 professionals operating the Prüm system,
also known as Prüm National Contact Points (NCPs).
Participants were first identified from the public contact list provided in the
Working Party on Information Exchange and Data Protection documents (European
Union Council, 2015), and then by contacting privileged informants in the area.
Participants were recruited by email, letter, and telephone calls. Interviews included
the collection of the following information: views on and experience with the imple-
mentation of Prüm at state and European levels, opinions about the purpose and con-
tribution of Prüm, ethical issues raised by the transnational exchange of DNA data,
expectations about DNA technology development and innovation, and perceptions
related to communication with the public. To protect the identity of the participants,
a letter was attributed to each country in which the participant is based.
Extracts from interviews conducted with NCPs referring to the particularities of
DNA data exchange and forms of constructing suspicion were coded and subjected to
multiple readings to develop an in-depth understanding. To prevent narrow framings
of categories of suspicion, the notion was made researchable by considering not only
ideas about suspect or criminal groups but also what the professionals directly cited
as being important considerations when making decisions about data processing, man-
agement, and subsequent use. These quotations were then systematically compared,
contrasted, synthesized, and coded by theme and thematic category following the prin-
ciples of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006), then interpreted using a qualitative con-
tent analysis approach (Mayring 2004). 
Prüm step one and two: A two-fold journey
Europe is gradually transforming into a digital and selective border machine
(Broeders, 2007; Van der Ploeg, 1999). The narratives of the experts who operate the
Prüm system highlight an ambivalence between the celebration of a European society
that facilitates movement and promotes the idea of “no borders” on the one hand,
and, on the other, increasingly attempts to restrict and monitor the mobility of people
deemed problematic: 
We are just getting globalised. … In terms of fighting crime, the freer the
movement of people the harder things can get. [Country K]
In this sense, the Prüm system, by allowing the automatic exchange of DNA profiles
across countries, is seen by interviewees as way to “control” potentially dangerous
people on the move:
[Prüm] gives us the opportunity to catch that guy who can travel freely in
all Europe. [Country G]
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The journey of DNA data in the Prüm system is based on a two-step approach.
The first step consists of an automatic exchange of DNA profiles. Specifically, when a
search is made in a national database for a DNA sample retrieved from a crime scene
and no match is found, the Prüm system permits the data to be transmitted and
searched in other EU member state national databases. A notification is then sent to
the original member state notifying it of a hit (a matching profile) or no hit. According
to interviewees, the journey of data in this first step of the Prüm system is characterized
by “neutrality” due to the use of impersonal identification numbers (Porter, 1995),
that is, numerical references to profiles. As the following quote illustrates, interviewees
believe that the apparent “neutrality” of codes and numbers protects the identity of
the person to whom the profile belongs, thus constructing what Helena Machado and
Rafaela Granja (2018) described as a black box for privacy issues within Prüm:
In the first step [of the Prüm system] you only compare DNA profiles, and
DNA profiles are only twenty or thirty numbers. There is nothing you can
tell about the owner of the DNA profile from the DNA profile itself.
[Country A]
When DNA profiles are automatically exchanged between countries, it constitutes an
operation that resonates with what Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson (2000) describe
as the “surveillant assemblage,” which “operates by abstracting human bodies from
their natural and territorial setting and separating them into a series of discrete flows”
(p. 606). However, “hidden” in the seeming neutrality of codes, numbers, and stan-
dards, DNA also plays a constitutive role in the construction of categories of suspicion.
The second step within the Prüm system occurs if a hit is identified. At this time
further requests for further information are processed through the existing police or
judicial channels (McCartney, 2014). Criminality is personalized—and territorialized—
in step 2, inasmuch as the type of crime, the name, the nationality, and other personal
data are disclosed. Such information leads to subsequent decisions by NCPs on what
matches “are worth” following, i.e., which data should continue their journey and
which journeys should be interrupted. There are several factors that might intervene
in such decisions, such as the time passed since the crime, the severity of the crime,
and the overall value for constructing valuable intelligence (Innes, Fielding, & Cope,
2005) for criminal investigation:
The main parameter is that if the case is not ongoing, and if the case is not
of a certain level, nobody will follow-up. Nobody. … The only aspect is to
make a balance between the additional value of going further or to stop
here. [Country H] 
Data is then reassembled into distinct “‘data doubles’ which can be scrutinized and
targeted for intervention” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 606).
The construction of categories of suspicion
Making decisions about data journeys also operate along specific notions of categories
of suspicion. This does not only mean the re-performance of the border of a nation-
state but also the performance of the subject identified by the DNA profile. In such an
assessment, interviewees describe how Europe’s risky others come in many versions.
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One of the most prominent categories of suspicion in the Prüm data journeys is the
foreigner from Eastern Europe countries. The following quote is from a Prüm NCP-
based country in central Europe:
Since the early 2000s, with criminals from East European countries and
so on, there are a lot of networks. … So, people are crossing, and with
Schengen that’s quite easy, you know. … People are coming, so we [know]
a list of Lithuanian networks, we know Romanian networks, Bulgarian
networks, Polish networks, and so on. [Country H] 
The hopes and concerns that accompany the journeys of DNA data across different
sites of practice and distinct vast data infrastructures generate particular data-based
suspect subjectivities. The choice of which data should be prioritized and looked at
operates along specific notions of categories of suspicion. Data that are collected in
one place and from a particular set of persons contribute to assessing and judging dif-
ferent persons in different places. This has one important consequence, as data jour-
neys do not always entail the reassembling of personal data that then imposes
suspicion on a person. Often, there is a pattern that leads to data-based judgments.
Rather than just presenting a request-check for information and responding to a re-
quest, data journeys are differently apprehended and integrated into the Prüm system.
As described by the following interviewee, some categories of suspicion imply imme-
diate actions:
We know by investigation experience that such drug criminals, which are
very often Nigerians, they also move very strongly. They are very often in
the Netherlands, in France, in Spain. So, we say: Such types of crime we
should be checking immediately against those, those, and those countries.
[Country M]
The narratives of participants reveal how the creation and consolidation of categories
of suspicion do not only depend on the actual information provided by the data, but
also on the larger social and political setting within which the data travel.
The mutability of data and its journeys
Besides making decisions about which matches to follow-up, interviewees also men-
tion limitations imposed on data journeys, especially with regard to the type and
amount of information that can be accessed at a transnational level. For example, once
country A makes a request to obtain more information about a DNA hit—a person
linked to a particular DNA profile—country B (which received the request) might de-
cide to share or not to share more information. As one interviewee states: “every coun-
try is free to share with the rest of the EU whatever they want on a national level”
[Country C].
Many interviewees occupy different positions. Representatives of countries in
which the custody of the DNA database is in the hands of the police tend to believe
that all information available should be provided in order to collaborate successfully
and achieve the same goal. In countries where the custody of forensic DNA databases
is in the hands of the judiciary, the information provided is generally restricted to a
minimum. The following quotations are illustrative of such different positionings:
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As soon as it is available … we send back the information … we can all to-
gether disrupt all the [crime] networks. [Country H]
This data is only for our use, no one else has access to this. … If you are in-
forming about the data a second country, when we get a hit, we have a
strict list of data that we can provide them. [Country G]
Such different attitudes toward the availability of data outline how the mutability of
data—how they are adapted for different purposes and acted on by diverse practition-
ers—plays a particularly significant role in the Prüm system. The EU rests on the
utopian idea that borders do not exist, which is (at least partially) characterized by
the increased strength of networks of cooperation among different countries. Borders
in the EU are, however, very real institutions, with the associated border technologies.
Data journeys in such a context, thus, simultaneously perform openness and enclo-
sure—a constant dialectical interplay. 
Conclusion
The results of this case study about the data journeys of DNA data across the EU sug-
gests that not only do data journeys perform a different version of Europe, they also
perform several forms of categories of suspicion. This forms two types of interrelated
narratives. First, by enrolling and translating heterogeneous elements into sets of data
that determine, enact, and perform categories of suspicion, and second, by managing
controversies related to data journeys between different jurisdictions that (re)create
borders within EU.
This Prüm case study—located in the wider account of the changing dynamics of
technology, geopolitics, and criminalization—thus allows for the empirical exploration
of issues of power and social justice in an age of datafication. Taking into consideration
the increasing shifts in several domains of social life to collect and process massive
amounts of data, this case study articulates how, within contemporary projects that
aim to know and govern mobile bodies (Aas, 2011; Broeders, 2007), criminalization
might take place by managing several decisions related to the production, travels, and
use of data. Demonstrating how supranational- and state-level notions about cross-
border crime and suspect social groups and individuals, as well as attitudes over the
national ownership of data, are enacted, this case study begins to unravel some of the
societal implications of datafication. While initial concerns with the Prüm system fo-
cused on the issues of surveillance and privacy, this case study shows how an increased
emphasis should be placed on the fact that data journeys are not uniform and do not
implicate everyone in the same way. Data journeys within the Prüm system take part
in a system of social sorting, thus (re)constructing categories of suspicion in ways that
highlight geopolitical tensions. In such a context, questions of data justice require de-
tailed study to discover how data power works in different systems.
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